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may be governed by the two-year wrongful death statute of limita-
tions. Overall, however, the Bongiorno decision will improve judi-
cial efficiency to the extent that courts will not have to spend time
deciding issues extraneous to the merits and litigants will not
waste judicial resources by asserting unwarranted statute of limita-
tions defenses.
Olympia Bizekis
CPLR 3121: In a child custody action, production of a potential
custodian's hair sample for drug testing is reasonable and rele-
vant
CPLR 3121(a) permits a party to an action to compel the
physical, mental, or blood examination of another party" when the
latter's physical, mental, or blood condition is in controversy.' A
1 CPLR 3121(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Although CPLR 3121(a) makes no explicit
provision for the testing of corporeal samples other than blood, any relevant test given as
part of a physical examination authorized by this provision generally would be permitted.
See id., commentary at 571 (McKinney 1970); 3A WK&M 1 3121.02, at 31-430 (1988); see,
e.g., Adlerstein v. South Nassau Communities Hasp., 109 Misc. 2d 158, 164, 439 N.Y.S.2d
605, 610 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (in medical malpractice action alleging sterility,
plaintiff required to submit semen sample for physical examination); Cardinal v. University
of Rochester, 188 Misc. 823, 825-26, 71 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615-17 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1946)
(X-rays, urine sample, stomach pumping), aft'd, 271 App. Div. 1048, 69 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th
Dep't 1947).
2 CPLR 3121(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988); see, e.g., Fisher v. Fossett, 45 Misc. 2d 757,
758, 257 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1965) (in property damage action where
driver's defense would be based on blacking out, physical condition was in controversy).
The moving party bears the burden of proving that the condition is in controversy. See
Soybel v. Gruber, 132 Misc. 2d 343, 346, 504 N.Y.S.2d 354, 356 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1986). This showing may be made either by reference to the other party's affirmative injec-
tion of the matter into dispute or by offering substantiation of the condition's relevancy. Cf.
id. (plaintiff landlord's unsupported assertion that eighty-four-year-old tenant too ill to
maintain her apartment did not place tenant's condition in controversy). An allegation of
personal injury in a suit for damages subjects that party to a physical examination at the
request of the other party. See, e.g., Evens v. Denny's, Inc., 129 Misc. 2d 767, 768, 494
N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1985) (plaintiff initiating personal injury action
brings physical condition into controversy); Adlerstein, 109 Misc. 2d at 161, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
608 (same). In cases not involving personal injury, a party may affirmatively inject his or her
physical condition into dispute by referring to it either during pretrial examination or in the
pleadings. See, e.g., Wegman v. Wegman, 37 N.Y.2d 940, 941, 343 N.E.2d 288, 288, 380
N.Y.S.2d 649, 649 (1975) (in divorce action, wife who counterclaimed for alimony alleging
her poor health put her condition in controversy); Nalbandian v. Nalbandian, 117 App. Div.
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party can avoid a compelled physical examination by securing a
protective order,3 which requires a showing either that the thresh-
old discovery requirements of CPLR 3101 have not been met4 or
2d 657, 657, 498 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (2d Dep't 1986) (in claim for maintenance, plaintiff wife
put her psychiatric condition in issue by asserting in pretrial testimony that it prevented
her from working).
If the party to be examined does not affirmatively raise the issue, the moving party
must offer information to sustain his burden of proof; a mere allegation that the condition is
relevant is insufficient. See, e.g., Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 300, 250 N.E.2d 857, 864,
303 N.Y.S.2d 858, 869 (1969) (in personal injury action, defendant's alleged intoxication not
in controversy where supported only by plaintiff's pleading and sworn statement of plain-
tiff's attorney); Lohmiller v. Lohmiller, 118 App. Div. 2d 760, 760, 500 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (2d
Dep't 1986) (in child custody action, defendant's failure to offer evidence of wife's psychiat-
ric disability warranted protective order barring further mental examination); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 15, 1989, at 25, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County) (in action
where custody of child in issue, plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to submit to radioim-
munoassay testing denied where affidavits in support of motion based upon speculation and
surmise); Turner v. Town of Amherst, 62 Misc. 2d 257, 261, 308 N.Y.S.2d 547, 552 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1970) (Department of Motor Vehicles' records on unrelated accident and affida-
vit of plaintiff's attorney lacking personal knowledge insufficient to place defendant's eye-
sight in controversy). But see, e.g., Shalhoub v. Viverito, 133 Misc. 2d 765, 767, 508
N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1986) (denial in answer to plaintiff's unsup-
ported complaint that defendant infected her with genital herpes was enough to place con-
dition in controversy).
See CPLR 3103(a) (McKinney 1970). CPLR 3103(a) provides: "The court may...
make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclo-
sure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, em-
barrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts." Id.
" See CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). CPLR 3101(a) requires "full disclosure of
all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" by the par-
ties to the action. Id. The threshold requirements have been broadly construed to afford
liberal discovery of matters in dispute in order to further the goal of achieving the speedy
and inexpensive disposition of cases on their merits. See Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d
409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dep't 1964). "The purpose of disclosure procedures is to
advance the function of a trial to ascertain truth and to accelerate the disposition of suits."
Id. Although the statute speaks of "evidence" as being discoverable, the term has been judi-
cially expanded to include material that might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
See West v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 28, 29, 266 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602-03 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1965), modified, 28 App. Div. 2d 745, 280 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dep't
1967). In West, the plaintiff sued to recover the cost of a gravestone under a auto insurance
policy that provided for the payment of funeral services, and sought disclosure of the in-
surer's documents relating to such payments. Id. at 29, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 602. The insurer
argued that such information was not material and necessary to the trial of the action be-
cause the scope of the term "funeral services" was purely a matter of law. See id. The court
held that the documents were to be disclosed:
The word "evidence" as used in the statute has not been held equivalent to that
evidence which might be admissible upon the trial of the action. Disclosure ex-
tends to all relevant information calculated to lead to relevant evidence .... If
the information is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence in chief or in
rebuttal or for cross-examination, it should be considered material and necessary
in the prosecution or defense of the action. If there is some doubt of admissibility
1988]
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that the examination would be abusive.' Recently, in Burgel v.
upon the trial of the action, Special Term should permit discovery leaving the
ultimate decision to the trial court.
Id. at 29, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03.
Three years after the trial court's decision in West, the Court of Appeals held that any
relevant evidence is discoverable. See Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d
403, 407, 235 N.E.2d 430, 432-33, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1968). The Allen court interpreted
the words "material and necessary" liberally, requiring disclosure "of any facts bearing on
the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing
delay." Id. at 406, 235 N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
1 See CPLR 3103(a) (McKinney 1970). In the context of civil litigation, deciding
whether a particular physical test is abusive has been a recurring problem. Apparently, most
courts balance the probative value of the test against the potential physical harm or discom-
fort to the party to be examined. Usually, the probative value of the test has been assumed
because the requested test commonly was used in the medical profession. The courts' dis-
cussions have centered instead on the issue of risk or discomfort. In older cases where pro-
tective orders have been granted, the proposed tests were either dangerous to life or consti-
tuted a physical intrusion to the body, or both. See, e.g., Carrig v. Oakes, 259 App. Div. 138,
138-39, 18 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (4th Dep't 1940) (cystoscopic examination of plaintiff denied
because test potentially painful and sometimes fatal); Bartolotta v. Delco Appliance Corp.,
254 App. Div. 809, 809, 4 N.Y.S.2d 744, 744 (4th Dep't 1938) (plaintiff not required to ingest
barium before undergoing X-rays); Grill v. Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., 243 App. Div. 853,
853-54, 278 N.Y.S. 775, 776 (4th Dep't 1935) (denied request to compel plaintiff to undergo
breathing test using specific "oxygen dilution method" because no showing test was safe).
The rationale continues to be applied in more recent cases. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 94 App. Div. 2d 18, 22, 462 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (2d Dep't 1983) (per
curiam) (hysterosalpingogram barred because it posed threat to plaintiff's health); Goldman
v. Linkoff, 45 App. Div. 2d 709, 709, 356 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (2d Dep't 1974) (plaintiff pro-
tected from procedure in nature of myelogram because procedure was physical intrusion to
spine).
Where tests have been challenged but permitted, they generally have been unintrusive
tests, perceived as not imposing a threat to the patient's health or comfort. See, e.g., Fein-
berg v. Fairmont Holding Corp., 272 App. Div. 101, 102, 69 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (1st Dep't
1947) (X-rays); McCabe v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 252 App. Div. 760, 760, 298
N.Y.S. 861, 862 (2d Dep't 1937) (eye examination); Gimenez v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
236 App. Div. 804, 804, 259 N.Y.S. 597, 597 (2d Dep't 1932) ("X-ray photography has be-
come a common and generally accepted procedure in medical and surgical diagnosis"); Ad-
lerstein, 109 Misc. 2d 164, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (semen test not invasive and posed no risk
to patient).
In two cases, courts explicitly have balanced probative value against risk where the test
in question, a galvanic skin response test, was not a regularly used diagnostic method and
the reliability of the results was subject to doubt. In Habersham v. Grimaldi, 18 App. Div.
2d 615, 234 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1st Dep't 1962), the court approved the use of a galvanic skin
response test to assess the plaintiff's hearing loss, describing the test as "objective" and
possibly "of great assistance in reaching a just disposition of the cause." Id. at 615, 234
N.Y.S.2d at 599. The plaintiff was held not to be unduly burdened because the test was
brief, painless, and safe. Id. Less than two years after Habersham, the Second Department
addressed the same issue in Carpinelli v. Manhattan Bottling Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 792,
250 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2d Dep't 1964). The defendant had moved to have the plaintiff's hearing
evaluated by a psychogalvanic skin reaction test. Id. at 792, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 756. At Special
Term, the discovery request was denied on the ground that the psychogalvanometer, the
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Burgel, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that
neither showing had been made in a child custody action in which
a parent who had admitted to previous cocaine use was requested
to submit samples of her hair for drug analysis in order to deter-
mine whether such drug use had continued.
In Burgel, the plaintiff wife sued for divorce, and both parties
sought custody of their two children." The defendant alleged that
the plaintiff had habitually and continually used cocaine and
moved for an order to have a physician cut several strands of the
plaintiff's hair so that radioimmunoassay ("RIA") and confirma-
tory tests might be performed, purportedly to show whether she
had continued to use cocaine. 9 The plaintiff opposed the motion,
admitting to prior occasional cocaine use but maintaining such use
had stopped several months earlier.10 She also provided sworn
statements of two experts who claimed the proposed laboratory
instrument used in the test, had not yet received general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity such that the results of the test could be admitted into evidence. Id. at 793,250
N.Y.S.2d at 757. The Second Department reversed, stating that "[i]t is not disputed that
these tests are of some value ... and that they may result in important evidence of the...
plaintiff's condition." Id. The court noted that "[tihere is no requirement that the results of
the tests be decisive or invulnerable. For present purposes it is sufficient if . . . such results
may be admissible and may be of material assistance in the administration of justice." Id.
Admissibility would be determined at trial. See id., 250 N.Y.S.2d at 757-58. The court
added that the parties did not dispute that the tests were harmless and would lead neither
to pain nor discomfort. Id., 250 N.Y.S.2d at 757; see also Adlerstein, 109 Misc. 2d at 163,
439 N.Y.S.2d at 609-10 (approving of reasoning in Carpinelli).
141 App. Div. 2d 215, 533 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1988).
See id. at 218-19, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
6 Id. at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
Id. In his affidavit supporting the motion for an order compelling the test, "the de-
fendant stated that he had removed hair specimens from the drains of a sink and bathtub
used by the plaintiff and had forwarded them to an expert for testing." Id. at 219, 533
N.Y.S.2d at 738 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). According to the sworn statement of the defend-
ant's expert who tested the hair sample, RIA analysis showed "high, off-scale readings of
cocaine or cocaine-related substances from in the hair itself." Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
In the RIA test, a radioactively tagged target drug (or drug metabolite) is mixed with
the biological specimen along with antibodies that react to the drug. See K. ZEE E, DRUG
TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 2.02[1] (1988). The non-tagged drugs in the specimen, if any,
compete with the tagged drug to bind with the antibodies. See id. After separation of the
bound antibodies from the specimen, the radioactivity is measured, thus showing the ratio
of tagged drug to drugs found naturally in the specimen. See id. Because the RIA test can
give a false positive result, a confirmatory test "is essential." Id.; see Hanson, Drug Abuse
Testing Programs Gaining Acceptance in Workplace, Chem. & Eng'g News, June 2, 1986,
at 9. The most accurate confirmatory test is gas chromatography/mass spectrometry, which,
when used properly, approaches ninety-nine percent accuracy. K. ZEESE, supra, § 2.02[6].
10 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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tests were unreliable.1 In reply, supported by several scientific ar-
ticles, the defendant contended that RIA testing could provide a
"calendar" of plaintiff's cocaine use.12 The Supreme Court, West-
chester County, granted the defendant's motion to compel the
plaintiff to appear at the offices of a physician and submit hair
samples.'" The plaintiff appealed this order.14
The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that because the ex-
amination was reasonable, relevant, and minimally intrusive, the
Supreme Court's grant of the defendant's request was proper.15
Writing for the court, Justice Balletta noted that CPLR 3101 had
long been construed to afford liberal discovery, "limited by the test
of materiality to one of usefulness and reason.' 16 Because the chil-
dren's welfare was in issue, Justice Balletta added, discovery of the
facts surrounding the plaintiff's cocaine use went "to the very
heart of the custody dispute."' The court also noted that, despite
the novelty of the test and possible inadmissibility of the results,
the test could be performed because the rules for admissibility dif-
fer from the rules of discovery in that admissibility is determined
at trial.'
" Id. at 220, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
12 Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The defendant contended that RIA testing of various
segments of plaintiff's hair samples, when analyzed in conjunction with the average growth
rate of hair, could provide a "calendar" or "timetable" of the plaintiff's cocaine use. Id.
(Sullivan, J., dissenting). See generally K. ZEESE, supra note 9, § 2.03[5] (hair provides
historical record showing when drug use occurred).
1" Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 218-19, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 737. A separate order was later
entered to permit the defendant to have a female representative present when the hair sam-
ples were taken. Id.
14 Id.
,1 See id.
18 Id. at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 735. The court relied on Hoenig v. Westphal, 52 N.Y.2d
605, 422 N.E.2d 491, 439 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1981), for the proposition that disclosure "proce-
dures advance the truth-determining function of trial and speedy disposition of cases." Id.
at 608, 422 N.E.2d at 493, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
17 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 217, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 736. The court stated that the
physical and mental conditions of both parties were in issue because each was seeking cus-
tody of the children. See id. at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 735; see also Rosenblitt v. Rosenblitt,
107 App. Div. 2d 292, 293-94, 486 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (2d Dep't 1985) ("parties to a contested
custody proceeding place their physical and mental conditions in issue" because parental
health is relevant).
" Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 218, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37; see also Suzuki Perform-
ance of Huntington, Ltd. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 121 App. Div. 2d 530, 530-31, 504 N.Y.S.2d
25, 26 (2d Dep't 1986) (deposition of defendant's employees relevant and discoverable even
if possibly inadmissible); McKinney v. State, 111 Misc. 2d 382, 387, 444 N.Y.S.2d 386, 390
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (personnel files concerning state worker discoverable although admissibility in
doubt). See generally SIEGEL § 344, at 421 (1978) (discussing disclosure criteria under CPLR
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In dissent, Justice Sullivan agreed with the majority that
CPLR 3101 permits broad discovery at the discretion of the trial
court, that this was particularly important in custody disputes, and
that the question of the ultimate admissibility of the evidence was
not before the court.19 Nevertheless, the dissent argued that com-
pelling the production of corporeal samples for a test that was "bi-
zarre and unrecognized" and "wholly experimental" crossed be-
yond the limits of permissible discovery. 0 Justice Sullivan urged
that the order compelling the examination be reversed and the
matter remanded for a preliminary hearing and judicial determina-
tion of the reliability and validity of the RIA test,21 thereby sug-
gesting the established standard in New York criminal cases be
followed.22
The Burgel decision reaffirms the policy of the courts to per-
mit discovery which will expedite the disposition of a case without
unduly prejudicing the other party.23 The question of the plain-
tiff's cocaine use was clearly in controversy: not only was this a
3101(a)).
19 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 220-21, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 738-39 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 221, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 739 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
21 See id. at 225, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 741 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice Sullivan also
would have reversed that part of the order permitting the defendant's female representative
to take custody of the sample, concluding that the disinterested physician who takes the
sample could adequately preserve the chain of custody. See id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
22 In calling for an evidentiary hearing, the dissent referred to two criminal cases adopt-
ing a similar standard. In In re Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6
(1982), the Court of Appeals held that a court order to obtain blood samples of a criminal
suspect may be issued only if there exists probable cause to believe the suspect committed
the crime, a clear indication that material evidence would be found, and proof that the test
is reliable and safe. Id. at 291, 437 N.E.2d at 266, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 7. In Barber v. Rubin, 72
App. Div. 2d 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d Dep't 1980), an extraction of hair from the head of a
criminal suspect was permitted where there was "probable cause for the necessity of the
procedure," supported in part by showing both that the hair found in the victim's hand was
not her own and that the proposed test was reliable and safe. Id. at 352-55, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
457-59. The Burgel dissent conceded that the fourth amendment concerns which are appli-
cable to criminal cases do not apply to civil cases, but contended that in the type of case at
bar "no less compelling reasons . . . warrant a determination as to the relevancy, reliabil-
ity, and validity of the procedure . . . before the plaintiff can be required to submit to it."
Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 222-23, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice
Sullivan did not elaborate upon his reasons for this contention, however, stating only that
application of such a standard would be particularly appropriate in matrimonial actions
where the potential for discovery abuse is substantial. See id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The
Burgel majority rejected the dissent's reasoning, concluding that in this civil matter neither
the potential for abuse nor the alleged novelty of the test provided a plausible analogy to
the fourth amendment considerations found integral to the decisions in In re Abe A. and
Barber. Id. at 217-18, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
22 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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custody dispute in which the issue was injected by the very nature
of the cause,24 but also the plaintiff conceded that she had used
cocaine. 25 Furthermore, the moving party had provided a founda-
tion for the test through the affidavit of the expert who had tested
her hair sample.2 6 No privilege applied to prevent disclosure since
the plaintiff had placed the issue into controversy herself, both by
her admission and by contesting custody. 7 The information sought
was discoverable because it might have led to the production of
admissible evidence.2 s Moreover, despite doubt as to the ultimate
admissibility of the results, it is submitted that the test could have
led to a settlement of the case. For example, if a high reading were
found, rather than risk the issue of admissibility, the plaintiff
might have chosen to concede custody in exchange for more liberal
visitation rights.2 It is submitted that, despite the dissent's char-
acterization of the test, the cutting of the plaintiff's hair would
have been no more intrusive than a blood test so or a semen test,3 '
2 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
25 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 735; see Wegman v. Wegman, 37
N.Y.2d 940, 941, 343 N.E.2d 288, 288, 380 N.Y.S.2d 649, 649 (1975); supra note 2 and ac-
companying text.
21 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 219, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (Sullivan, J., dissenting); see
Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 300, 250 N.E.2d 857, 864, 303 N.Y.S.2d 858, 869 (1969);
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
27 CPLR 3101(b) provides an exclusion for information protected by a privilege, such as
the patient-physician privilege recognized in CPLR 4504. See CPLR 3101(b) (McKinney
1970). However, where a party places his or her condition in controversy in the pleadings or
by some affirmation during pretrial testimony, the patient-physician privilege is deemed
waived. See Koump, 25 N.Y.2d at 294, 250 N.E.2d at 861, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 864; 3A WK&M
3121.01, at 31-427.
28 See supra note 4. The Burgel court did not refer to Carpinelli, 21 App. Div. 2d 792,
250 N.Y.S.2d 756 (2d Dep't 1964), which had permitted a similarly disputed test (i.e., gal-
vanic skin response). It is suggested that the galvanic skin response test at issue in
Carpinelli is analogous to the RIA test, with respect to both reliability and harmlessness.
29 Information that is neither admissible nor likely to lead to admissible evidence has
been held discoverable when disclosure would be likely to encourage settlement or lead to a
more efficient trial. See, e.g., Falcone v. Repetti, 61 Misc. 2d 407, 408, 410, 305 N.Y.S.2d 784,
787, 788 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (disclosure of medical reports with "nugatory" evi-
dentiary value compelled because "paramount policy of complete pretrial discovery must be
adhered to-each party should know as much about the other's claim as is fairly and appro-
priately possible").
30 See, e.g., Hayt v. Brewster, Gordon & Co., 199 App. Div. 68, 72, 191 N.Y.S. 176, 179
(4th Dep't 1921) (pinprick blood test safe).
21 See, e.g., Adlerstein v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 109 Misc. 2d 158, 164, 439
N.Y.S.2d 605, 610 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1981) (semen test not a physical invasion). The
RIA test does not appear analogous to the types of tests that have been disallowed. See, e.g.,
Lefkowitz v. Nassau County Medical Center, 94 App. Div. 2d 18, 22, 462 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906
(2d Dep't 1983) (hysterosalpingogram: X-ray of uterus after injection of radiopaque sub-
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both of which have received judicial approval. Moreover, requiring
a preliminary hearing and judicial determination of the reliability
and validity of the test as a prerequisite to granting or denying
defendant's discovery request, as suggested by the dissent, would
conflict with one of the key goals of discovery, namely, the speedy
disposition of the case.2 Finally, the court recognized that it re-
tained the power to deny or limit a request if it found, in the par-
ticular case, that it would be abusive."
While the contours of the Burgel decision remain to be de-
fined for situations involving more intrusive drug testing or non-
custodial disputes, the court's message is clear: no reasonable re-
quest will be refused, and what is reasonable is to be broadly
defined.
Kevin G. Fales
stance); Goldman v. Linkoff, 45 App. Div. 2d 709, 709, 356 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (2d Dep't
1974) (myelogram: X-ray of spinal cord after injection of radiopaque dye into spinal mem-
brane); Carrig v. Oaken, 259 App. Div. 138, 138-39, 18 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (4th Dep't 1940)
(cystoscopy: inspection of interior of bladder with lighted tubular instrument).
11 See CPLR 104 (McKinney 1972). CPLR 104 provides that the CPLR "shall be liber-
ally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civil judi-
cial proceeding." Id.
11 Burgel, 141 App. Div. 2d at 218, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 737; see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text.
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